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ABSTRACT: Croatia’s Homeland war and 
aggression to Ukraine are clear examples that can 
be described with term Hybrid warfare. Different 
phases during conflict and war (every conflict is not 
a war; every war is a conflict) has a lot of similarities, 
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 but also has a difference. It is important to make 
deeper analysis to provide better and efficient 
lessons-learned preventive and active measures for 
future conflicts. 
This article starts with a short overview of Croatia’s 
Homeland war and continues with short overview of 
Ukrainian experience. It contains lessons-learned 
tools and suggestions for future activities. 
KEYWORDS: Hybrid warfare, Homeland war, 
Croatia, Ukraine, Russia, Crimea, Lessons learned  
 
Introduction 
The end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st 
century in Europe were marked by two wars: the 
bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and the 
aggression against Ukraine. Although they took 
place in different historical contexts, they have 
several common topics. The most important link 
between these two wars is that they represent a 
prime example of the type of war that, in recent 
years, has been called a hybrid war. Attacks on 
basement of all societies during the first phases 
of conflict (values, believes and principles) to 
divide society was visible. Importance of 
defending those pillars of any society was 
recognized and efficient countermeasures 
where adopted to win the war (in case of Croatia) 
and to stop the aggression (in case of Ukraine). 
 
Croatia’s Homeland war 
One of the wars that took place during and after 
the political disintegration of Yugoslavia was the 
Croatia’s Homeland War (1990-1996). 
Considering the activities of the aggressors 




















































 liberating the occupied parts of Croatia, the 
Homeland War can be divided into several 
phases according to its hybrid characteristics: 
(1) Phase dominated by information 
warfare and psychological 
operations by which the then political 
and military leadership of 
Yugoslavia, and primarily Serbia and 
Montenegro, tried to prevent the 
beginning of political 
democratization and possible 
political changes (organization and 
implementation of the first multi-
party, democratic and free elections 
in Yugoslavia) in Croatia (1988-
1990) 
(2) In the second phase (1990- mid 
1991), after the democratic elections 
and the complete change of the 
political paradigm in Croatia and 
Slovenia, information and 
psychological operations were 
further intensified by Yugoslavian 
and Serbian side with stronger and 
more visible use of armed 
paramilitary formations and the 
involvement of armed forces on the 
rebel side under the motto “prevents 
further escalation of conflict and 
stopping violence”. This phase was 
marked by significant activities in the 
field of spreading anti-Croatian 
propaganda in foreign media by 
distributing numerous disinformation 
with the aim of imposing the view that 
Croatia is a neo-fascist state in order 
to prevent the internationalization of 
aggression against Croatia and to 









































 recognition of Croatia. At the same 
time, there was an intensification and 
threats of stronger engagement of 
the armed forces of Yugoslavia and 
Serbia if the democratically elected 
government in Croatia is not 
overthrown. This is a phase that can 
still be called a conflict of a hybrid 
nature because influence operations 
dominated in a spectrum of conflicts. 
The decision to make full use of the 
kinetic force on the aggressor side 
has not yet been made. 
(3) Third phase (mid 1991 - early 1992) 
was characterized by an armed 
aggression against Croatia when the 
Yugoslav and Serbian armed forces, 
together with the rebel Serbs from 
Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, occupied almost 1/3 of 
the territory of the Republic of 
Croatia. This is the phase when the 
hybrid conflict passes into the phase 
of a hybrid war in which the dominant 
role is taken by using kinetic force 
while the influence operations were 
conducted as a support tool in the 
background. 
(4) After the Republic of Croatia was 
recognized by the international 
community in January 1992, the 
armed aggression was calmed down 
and stopped. However, influence 
operations continued with the same 
goal as before the beginning of the 
armed aggression. During 1992 and 
1993, Croatia actively worked on 
creating conditions and developing 




















































 occupied parts of its territory. The 
Croatian state leadership makes 
decisions that go in the direction of 
creating and developing military-
civilian capabilities, based on 
positive experiences from the history 
of conflicts and wars, and following 
the example of Western 
democracies, the organization of its 
armed forces and the intelligence 
community. The developed 
capabilities were integrated into a 
functional unit in order to achieve the 
expected results by working together 
and acting, provided that the number 
of possible/expected victims (on both 
sides) were reduced to the lowest 
possible level, just as destruction of 
property as low as it is possible, and 
kinetic operations needs to be 
conducted as short as possible. This 
time, until mid-1994, was marked by 
the continuation of influence 
operations conducted by the 
aggressors. However, Croatia has 
developed its own defense 
capabilities that have reached the 
level of early recognition, 
identification and disclosure of 
distributed disinformation infiltrated 
into the Croatian and international 
public media space. The capabilities 
of the intelligence community were 
developed, which effectively 
competed with the aggressor, 
because the basis of all serious 
influence operations are the 
operations of the aggressor’s 
intelligence community. In this way, 









































 increased, as well as the capabilities 
for preparing the liberation of the 
occupied parts of the territory of the 
Republic of Croatia. 
(5) In mid-1994, Croatia started using 
integrated military-civilian crisis 
management capabilities and, with 
considerable preparation and use of 
influence operations, started using 
kinetic force. From the end of 1994 
and during 1995, several military-
police operations were carried out, 
liberating most of the occupied 
territory of the Republic of Croatia. 
Influential operations, planned and 
conducted by the Croatian side, also 
played a significant role in these 
operations. This is a phase 
dominated by the use of kinetic force 
which is why we can talk about 
hybrid warfare again. 
(6) With the completion of the military-
police operation “Storm” (in Croatia) 
in August 1995 and the “Maestral” 
and “Southern Move” (in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) in September/October 
1995, conditions were created for 
ending the war in general. Peace 
talks have begun, which have also 
been marked by intensive influence 
operations planned and conducted 
by all stakeholders. The Dayton 
Peace Accords were signed, and the 
peaceful reintegration of the Croatian 
Danube region began, which was 
completed in January 1998 as an 
administrative process. This time, as 
well as the one after that, was 




















































 disinformation, which is why we can 
talk about a conflict of a hybrid 
nature. 
 
Croatia: Lessons learned - integration of capabilities 
Therefore, we can say that the Croatia’s 
Homeland War is a prime example of a modern 
war of a hybrid nature. During its duration, the 
aggressor tried to achieve goals of different 
levels of importance in different areas of interest 
through numerous activities at the tactical and 
strategic level. It integrated the capabilities of the 
civilian and military spectrum. However, the 
coordination of their system and the integration 
into a manageable organizational form at the 
level of strategic planning and decision-making 
was not effective. The Croatian side has 
achieved just that: it has integrated its 
capabilities from both the civilian and military 
sectors, coordinated their activities and linked 
them into a meaningful organizational 
framework, clearly defined strategic goals that it 
efficiently communicated to its own population 
and the international community by developing 
strategic communication skills. It is this, clear 
vision of Croatia's future, which was 
communicating with the public, that has led the 
Croatian public to give full support to its 
institutions in the process of reintegrating the 
occupied parts of Croatia into the constitutional 
and legal order. In the case that we were not so 
strongly supported by our people, all efforts by 
Croatian civilian and military defense capabilities 
to develop and address the challenges they 
faced, would have been very difficult to 
implement. 
By joining NATO and the EU, Croatia has fulfilled 









































 achieving strategic goals: creating a modern, 
democratic, secure and stable Croatia as a 
responsible member of these integrations that 
can share its experiences with others to help 
them in times when they too are/were faced with 
the same or similar problems. In this context, the 
exchange of knowledge and experiences 
between Croatia and Ukraine should be 
considered in the context of dealing with modern 
forms of conflicts and wars of a hybrid nature. 
 
Aggression to Ukraine 
Considering the aggression to which Ukraine 
was exposed during 2014, given the situation in 
which it found itself, and the similarity with the 
Croatian Homeland War, there was a need to 
exchange knowledge and experiences at the 
international level. 
At the geopolitical level, the conflict and war in 
Ukraine was caused by Russian foreign policy 
reversal towards competitive confrontation with 
the West and restoration of Russia’s imperial 
essence. At the regional and military-strategic 
level, the causes of the conflict and war were 
Russia's restoration of its dominance within the 
USSR's territorial boundaries and further 
expansion of its influence on the territory of the 
former Warsaw Pact, as well as the threat to 
Russia and access to the Middle East. Each 
conflict has its own features and peculiarities. 
But the conflict which took part on the Ukrainian 
territory has demonstrated a qualitative leap in 
forms, methods, and procedures of using state 
resources to achieve political objectives.  
The current goals of the Russian Federation in 
relation to Ukraine can be considered by the 




















































 ensuring the neutral status of Ukraine, greater 
economic and political independence of its 
regions. The main long-term interest of the 
Russian Federation can be considered to ensure 
the favorable political and economic course of 
Ukraine. In general, it can be noted that the 
actions of the Russian Federation have become 
much tougher on Ukraine since the beginning of 
the conflict. 
 
Hybrid war’s Expert Analysis 
Expert team of the National Defense University 
of Ukraine during 2019-2020 wrote an analysis 
that addresses various aspects of a hybrid 
aggression concept, summarizes current views 
on counteracting scenarios and the use of 
military and non-military tools in the integrated 
Joint Forces Operation, provides appropriate 
methodological and practical guidelines for 
countering hybrid threats. Most of authors of this 
monograph took part in countering Russian 
aggression in the East of Ukraine. 
Ukrainian experience has showed that the 
Russian Federation preferred the use of military, 
informational and psychological, as well as 
economic and political resources to achieve their 
strategic goals. Also, they are aware of the 
importance of integration of paramilitary 
organizations and conducting influence 
operations in any conflict. 
 
Actions that can be classified as the armed 
aggression were carried out only by the Russian 
Federation. Such actions were: 









































 (2) Sending armed groups of regular 
and irregular forces to Ukrainian 
territory; 
(3) Fire support of combat actions of 
illegal armed groups in eastern 
Ukraine from units of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation; 
(4) Blocking Ukrainian ships travelling to 
ports on the Azov coast. 
According to Ukrainian legislation, the actions of 
the Russian Federation fall under the definition 
of the armed aggression. From the perspective 
of the large-scale use of military force, Ukraine’s 
accession to NATO, coercive return of the AR of 
Crimea and coercive restoration of control over 
the occupied territories in the East of Ukraine are 
unacceptable to Russia. Russian leaders have 
formed a “second echelon” of intervention. On 
the eastern border with Russia and in the 
annexed Crimea, the Russian military command 
has already deployed a nearly 100,000-strong 
group of career servicemen which outnumbers 
the occupying forces in terms of combat 
readiness. 
 
Ukraine: Lessons learned – recommendations and 
integration of capabilities 
Threats of a military (and hybrid) nature formed 
not by purely military but rather non-military 
factors require equally comprehensive 
response. Military threat hybridity is evidenced 
by hidden, purposeful, destructive, and 
comprehensive influence on the national 
security system, i.e. in a set of both military and 
non-military factors (intentions and actions) 




















































 It should be noted that countering hybrid threats 
is a complex process due to many different 
factors shaping these threats and difficulties in 
predicting changes in the intensity of their 
impact. To practically implement the determined 
forms and methods of integration of military and 
non-military forces and means of counteraction, 
it is advisable to have a concept of their 
comprehensive use. It is necessary to have a 
Conceptual model of managing the integrated 
countermeasures potential. It gives an 
opportunity to substantiate a rational 
composition of forces and means for de-
escalation of the identified (predicted) threats 
and assess real possibilities for neutralization of 
specific military threats and threats with signs of 
“hybridity”. It also evaluates the effectiveness of 
the use of forces and means of individual 
Ukrainian security and Defence sector 
components integrated to counter the threat. 
The need of joint and mutually agreed use of 
military and non-military forces and means in 
countering the hybrid aggression is do not only 
desire to avoid duplication of tasks for individual 
security and defence sector components and 
efficient use of resources, but also to change the 
role and place of purely military means in 
countering the hybrid aggression. 
One of the main conclusions from Russia’s 
hybrid war against Ukraine is that the role of its 
information component has multiplied. In 
resource-limited setting, the state should use all 
possible forms of attracting non-government 
actors through public-private partnerships and 
liaison with civil society structures and individual 
citizens to effectively support cyber defence. 
One of the state’s main tasks on ensuring 
information security of the MoD and the UAF is 









































 adverse information and psychological impacts 
on the UAF personnel. This necessitates 
establishment of an appropriate system. It is 
especially relevant for Ukraine after the 
beginning of the hybrid aggression of the 
Russian Federation, when the consequences of 
such an external influence became acute and 
tangible. 
Strategic communication mechanism is the most 
important element of ensuring state information 
security and counteracting the hybrid aggression 
against Ukraine. Strategic communications 
should be considered as activity which is 
coordinated at the strategic (military-political) 
governance level and aimed at managing 
decision-making processes both within the 
country (group of countries) and abroad to defeat 
the enemy. 
The organization of interaction between the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine and the civilian 
environment (governmental and non-
governmental) in the areas of deployment of 
military units or in the areas of deployment to 
perform assigned tasks is an urgent task that 
relies on civil-military cooperation. The creation 
of the CIMIC organizations was based on the 
study of international experience of coordination 
between military units and the civilian 
population, during peacekeeping operations 
under the auspices of the UN and other 
international security organizations. CIMIC 
servicemen work both in the "gray zone" and 
along the line of contact. In addition, CIMIC 
groups are making considerable efforts to 
release Ukrainian servicemen from captivity. 
The CIMIC released 13 servicemen of the Armed 





















































 The groups of the Central Command of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine are tasked with 
coordinating the activities of public authorities, 
international humanitarian organizations in the 
field of mine safety, delivery of humanitarian 
goods, restoration of critical infrastructure 
(electricity, gas, water supply systems), housing 
repair. There is a need to deepen the dialogue 
on the use of existing methods of providing UN 
military assistance, based on acts of 
international law, due to the threat of a full-scale 
war between Russia and Ukraine. The choice by 
the military-political leadership of the state of an 
appropriate strategy for settling the conflict is 
impossible without considering the behavior of 
the other side of the conflict and the nature of the 
assistance provided to it. Such assistance can 
be provided simultaneously in many areas of 
existing conflict (political, economic, and 
financial support, supply of weapons and 
equipment, training, etc.). 
 
Conclusion 
Croatian experience in facing hybrid aggression 
can be very valuable for future conflicts 
prediction and as basement for establishing 
efficient early-warning integrated all-society-
system. Croatia was able, even though it was 
faced with more powerful aggressor then Croatia 
at that time, to defend its strategy. To win the 
battle for minds, hearts and soul, to win the war 
for information, against the information with the 
information.  
The experience of conflict resolution in eastern 
Ukraine has shown that Russia's support to the 
self-proclaimed republics is comprehensive and 
increases or decreases in areas that correspond 









































 environment of influence on Ukraine's 
leadership. 
Russia's policy on the world stage is systematic 
and coordinated. The Kremlin uses a wide 
arsenal of means of "hybrid" aggression to 
implement tactical tasks, among which we can 
single out the massive offensive propaganda of 
powerful Russian foreign broadcasting (Russia 
Today, Sputnik etc.), which is an effective 
information weapon, a powerful unit of rail 
information products and a means of targeted 
promotion of Russian ideology and the concept 
of "Russian world". The events of 2014–2020 for 
Ukraine became a vital test of resistance to 
“hybrid” aggression. The effectiveness of 
counteracting "hybrid" threats can be achieved 
first by introducing adequate and mutually 
agreed actions (measures) not only in the 
military sphere, but also in other spheres of 
national security. 
 
  
